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Abstract 
The stable model semantics for logic programs is extended from ground literals onto open 
literals by augmenting the program language with an infinite set of new constants. This, in turn, 
leads to a natural translation of logic programs into open default theories. @ 1997 Elsevier 
Science B.V. 
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1. Introduction 
An unfortunate drawback of the Gelfond-Lifschitz stable model semantics for logic 
programs [6,7] is that it deals with satisfiability of closed (or ground) literals only. 1 
In this p,aper we extend the stable model semantics to open literals by considering the 
Herbrand universe of the program language augmented with a countable2 set of new 
constants. 
The idlea of augmenting the program language with a countable set of new constants 
appeared for the lirst time in [ 121 and a bit later it appeared in [23] and, in some 
variation, in [ 81. As it was stated in [24], introducing new constants is needed to 
ensure “that goals with free variables have “room to fail” when they should, even in 
their instantiated versions.” However, none of [ 241, [ 121, [ 231, or [ 81 addresses the 
problem “how much “room to fail” is required,” i.e., how many new constants hould 
be added to the program language. This problem is not trivial at all, because, as we 
1 The leafst Herbrand model semantics for definite programs uffers from a similar problem. For this reason 
it is incomplete with respect o the SLD-resolution, see [ 201. 
2 In this paper, “countable” means infinite countable. 
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show in the last section, logic programs (interpreted over the extended stable model 
semantics) are naturally translated into open default theories for which the restriction 
to the language augmented with a countable set of new constants is not complete, see 
[ 111. That is, in some cases, augmenting the language with an uncountable set of new 
constants results in extensions which cannot be obtained by augmenting the language 
with countably many new constants. This is in contrast to classical first-order logic 
for which the Herbrand semantics over the language augmented with countably many 
new constants is complete, see [ 10, Proposition 331, say. Our main result states that, 
when dealing with the extended stable model semantics, we can restrict ourselves to the 
language augmented with a countable set of new constants. 
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we recall the Herbrand semantics 
of first-order logic. Sections 3, 4, and 5 deal with logic programs, least Herbrand model 
semantics for definite programs, and the extended stable model semantics for general 
programs, respectively. 3 In Section 6 we recall the semantical definition of extensions 
for default theories. Finally, in Section 7 we show that embeddings of logic programs into 
closed default theories, known from the literature, can be extended to our semantics and 
open default theories. Section 7 also contains two new embeddings of logic programs 
into default logic which are based on the closed world assumption [21]. The new 
embeddings emphasize the negation-as-failure nature of the stable model semantics and 
indicate a “circumscriptive” behavior of logic programs. 
2. Herbrand semantics of first-order logic 
Our semantical approach to logic programs and open default theories is based on 
the Herbrand semantics of first-order logic. We shall need the following notation and 
definitions. 
The language of the underlying first-order logic will be denoted by .C. Let b be a 
set that contains no symbols of ,C and let Lb denote the language obtained from .C by 
augmenting its set of constants with all elements of 6. The set of all closed terms of & 
denoted TermLbr is called the Her-brand universe of Lb. A Herbrund b-interpretation is 
a set of closed (or ground) atomic formulas of Lb. 
Let w be a Herbrand b-interpretation and let 5p be a sentence (closed formula) of Lb. 
We say that w sutis$es 9, denoted w b 9, if the following holds. 
l If q is an atomic formula, then w k cp if and only if q E w; 
l w~q~>ifandonlyifw#gporw~& 
l w+Tpifandonlyifw#cp;and 
l w + Vq( x) if and only if for each t E TermE,,, w k p(t) . 
For a Herbrand b-interpretation w we define the L-theory of w, denoted 2%~: (w), as 
the set of all sentences of J!Z satisfied by w. Let X be a set of sentences of C. We say 
that w is a (Herbrand) b-model of X, if X & 2%~ (w) . Finally, for a class of Herbrand 
3 Section 5 and, to some extent, Section 4 require an acquaintance with the SLD-resolution. The necessary 
results can be found in [ 16, Sections 7 and 81. 
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interpretations W we define the L-theory of W, denoted ntc( W), as the set of all 
sentences of L satisfied by all elements of W. That is, Thr. ( W) = nwEW ThL (w) . 
3. Logic programs 
In this very short section we recall the syntax of general logic programs. In logic 
programming atomic formulas are referred to as atoms. Atoms and their negations4 
are called liter&. In particular, atoms are positive literals and negations of atoms are 
negative literals. The set of all literals of L will be denoted by LitL. 
A (general) logic program 17 is a set of rules (program clauses) of the form 
A+ L1,...,L,,,, 
where A is an atom and LI, . . . , L, are literals. The atom A is called the head of the 
rule, and Ll, . . . , L, is called the body of the rule. The program II is called dejinite, if 
all literal:; L1, . . . , L, are positive. 
We say that a Herbrand interpretation w is a model of a program 17, denoted w k 17, 
if for eac:h rule A +- L1 , , . . , L, of n, w satisfies the universal closure of A”,, Li 1 A. 
Finally, a literal L is a logical consequence of n, if each model of n satisfies L. It 
is well-known that an atom A is a logical consequence of a definite program lI if and 
only if there is an SLD-refutation of c A from 17, see [ 16, Theorem 7.1, p. 43, and 
Theorem 8.4, p. 481. 
4. Least Herbrand model semantics for definite programs and the universal query 
problem 
This section contains examples which illustrate the necessity of augmenting the pro- 
gram language with new constants. First we recall the definition of the standard (declara- 
tive) least Herbrand model semantics for definite programs. An atom A is a consequence 
of a definite program 17 with respect to the least Herbrand model semantics if A is sat- 
isfied by the least (with respect to inclusion 5) Herbrand @model of n. 5 
It is wiell-known that the least Herbrand model semantics is not complete with respect 
to the SLD-resolution (the procedural semantics). The reason for the incompleteness 
is very simple: The restriction to the ground instances of an atom is not sufficient to 
determinl: whether the atom is a logical consequence of a logic program, see Example 1 
below. A comprehensive discussion of the above incompleteness and a possible solution 
to it, can be found in [ 201, where the incompleteness is termed the universal query 
problem. 
4 Following [ 161 and [6] we use 7 to denote both the classical negation (in first-order formulas) and 
negation-a.r-failure (in program clauses), whereas in [7] 7 denotes the classical negation and negation-as- 
failure is denoted by nor. 
5 This mcsdel always exists, see [ 16, Theorem 6.1, p. 361. 
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Example 1 (see [ 16, Example, p. 391). Let n consist of one rule P(a) t. Then the 
least Herbrand @model of n satisfies P(X) , whereas P(x) is not a logical consequence 
of n. 
The deficiency of Herbrand g-interpretations in the case of Example 1 disappears 
when passing to Herbrand b-interpretations with a non-empty set of new constants b. 
However, Example 2 below shows that, in general, we cannot restrict ourselves to a 
fixed finite set of new constants b. 
Example 2. Let P be an n-place predicate and let n consist of all rules of the form 
P(x,,... ,Xi-l,X,Xi+l,...,xj-l,X,xj+l,..., &I) +-, l<i<j<n. 
If b contains less than n elements, then, obviously, each Herbrand b-model of 17 sat- 
isfies P(xr,x2,. . . , x, ) , because each n-tuple over b contains two identical components, 
However, P ( XI , x2, . . . ,x,) is not a logical consequence of 17. 
At this point one can still hope that for each program n there is a finite set of 
new constants bn such that an atom A is satisfied by the least Herbrand bn-model of 
I7 if and only if A is a logical consequence of n. In the next example we present a 
definite program ZI such that for no finite set of new constants b, the least Herbrand 
b-interpretations are complete for 17. 
Example 3. Let n consist of the following three rules: 
P(f(f(X,X)TY)) +, 
P(f(y,x)) + P(f(x,y)), and 
Using the “commutativity” and the “associativity” of f provided by the second and 
the third rules, it can be easily verified that P(t) is a logical consequence of n if and 
only if t contains two or more occurrences of f and two or more occurrences of some 
variable. 
For a positive integer n > 2 we define the term t, by induction as follows: t2 is 
f (xl, x2), and tn+l is f (t,, xn+l ) . Now, if b is an n-element set of new constants, 
IZ 2 2, then P( t,+l), not being a logical consequence of 17, is satisfied by the least 
Herbrand b-model of l7. 
Remark 4. Let A be an atom with n variables that is not a logical consequence of a 
definite program 17 and let b be an n-element set of new constants. It can be readily 
seen that the least Herbrand b-model of 17 does not satisfy A. 
We conclude this section with the note that, by [ 10, proposition 331, an atom A is 
a logical consequence of a definite program n if and only if A belongs to the least 
Herbrand b-model of 17 for a countable set of new constants b. In the next section we 
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show that a similar equivalence holds for general logic programs and the stable model 
semantics. 
5. Stable model semantics 
In this section we extend the Gelfond-Lifschitz stable model semantics [6,7] onto 
Herbrand b-interpretations which will allow us to deal with satisfiability of open literals. 
Then we prove the main result of the paper stating that we can always restrict ourselves 
to the case when b is countable, cf. [ 11 I. We start with a sequence of notations. 
For a rule rr we denote by rTT+ the rule obtained from 7r by deleting all negative 
literals from its body. That is, if 7c is of the form 
A +- B1 I..., Bk.+ik+l,..., +,,, 
where B1, . . . , B, are atoms, then ?T+ is of the form 
A+B1,...,Bk. 
Let b ble a set of new constants. We denote by fib the set of all closed instances of 
ZI in &,. Recall that the language Lb results from L by augmenting its set of constants 
with all elements of b. 
Finally, for a set w of closed atoms of Lb, IZi is the logic program obtained from 
ZIb by deleting each rule that has a negative literal TB in its body with B E w, and fit 
is the logic program obtained from flk by deleting all negative literals from its rules. 
That is, fit = {7~+ 1 T E A$,}. 
By definition, nk is a definite logic program. Therefore n: has the least Herbrand 
b-model Snb ( w) . If w = Sflb (w), then w is called a (b-) stable model of n. 6 That is, 
w is a b-stable model of n if and only if w is a fixed point of the operator Snb. In 
particular, if w is a stable model of n, then w k n. 
Definition 5. A literal L (of the underlying language L) is a logical consequence of 
a program I7 under the stable model semantics, if L is satisfied by all stable models 
of 17. 
If we denote by LitL (w) the set of all literals of L satisfied by w, then, by Defi- 
nition 5, a literal L is a logical consequence of a program n under the stable model 
semantics if and only if L E nb n,=,,, cwJ LitL ( w) . 
Note that in the case of ground literals Definition 5 is equivalent to the corresponding 
Gelfond-Lifschitz definition [ 6,7]. However, the examples in the previous section and 
Example 9 below show that the extension of the Gelfond-Lifschitz definition to non- 
ground literals is not adequate. 
6 In the original Gelfond-Lifschitz definition of a stable model, b = 0, see [6,71. 
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Remark 6. Even though, there is no computational counterpart of Definition 5, the 
SLDNF-resolution [4] is sound with respect to the extended stable model semantics. 7 
Indeed, it can be readily verified that b-stable models of a logic program 17 are fixed 
points of the immediate consequence operator Th defined by 
T;(w) = {A ) for some A +-- Ll,. . 
i=l 
Thus, by [ 1, Lemma 4.4, p. 251, stable models of 17 satisfy comp(I7) - the Clark 
completion of the program n, see [ 1, p. 241 for the definition of comp( II). Now 
soundness of the SLDNF-resolution with respect to the extended stable model semantics 
follows from its soundness with respect to the Clark completion, see [ 1, Theorem 4.16, 
p.281. 
Theorem 7 below whose proof is postponed to the end of this section states that when 
dealing with the extended stable model semantics we can restrict ourselves to stable 
models over fZ, for a fixed countable set of new constants c. 
Theorem 7. For any set of new constants b and for any b-stable model w of I7 there 
is a c-stable model w’ of II such that Lite (w) = Litr. (w’). 
Theorem 7 has the following immediate corollary. 
Corollary 8. A literal L is a logical consequence of a program lI under the stable 
model semantics if and only if L E r)w=snC (,+) Litr. (w). 
The above corollary looks very similar to the definition of entailment in [8]: A 
program 17 entails a literal L if for each finite set of new constants b, L is satisfied by 
all b-stable models of n. By Remark 4, for a definite program 17, a literal L is a logical 
consequence of ZI if and only if 17 entails L. However for general programs the notions 
of logical consequence and entailment are not equivalent. The following example shows 
that the definition in [ 81 is too weak. 
Example 9. In this example we present a program 17 that can “count” the number of 
new constants. The program consists of the following rules: 
(1) N(O) + 
(2) N(f(x,y)) + 
(3) P(f(O,~),O)) + TN(X) 
(4) P(f(Ovf(%Y)),O) + P(f(O,Y),O)),+(n) 
(3 P(x,O) + P(f(O,x),O)) 
(6) E(x,x) + 
7 This fact was communicated to the author by kystof Apt. 
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(7) P(f(f(x,u>,f(w,y)),z) + P(f(u,f(w,f(n,y))>,z),lE(w,u),~~(~,~) 
(8) P~(f(w,x),f(o,z>> + J’(f(f(w,x),~),z) 
(9) C(x) +- P(YvX) 
(10) F + C(X),+J(.f(O,X)) 
Since the language of II contains only one constant 0 and only one function f, by 
rules 1 and 2, for any b-stable model w of 17 and any t E TetmLb, w k 4V( t) implies 
t E b. Thus, rules 3,4, and 5 allow to produce a list of elements of b (new constants) in 
the first place of P. Such lists are of the form f( bl , f( b2, f( b3, . . . , f( bi_1, bi) . . .) ) ) . 
By rule 6, w k lE( tl, t2) implies tl # t2. Therefore, rule 7, allows to compare 
an element in the list with its neighbors (w with x and v) and move it right, if the 
inequalities hold. * 
Rule 8 allows to stop the comparing process by cutting of a tail of the list. Since, 
by the previous paragraph, the first element in the tail is different from the elements 
which precede it in the list, the number of applications of this rule cannot exceed the 
cardinality of the set of new constants b. Note that each application of this rule increases 
the term :in the second place of P (the counter) by 1. 9 Therefore the term in the second 
place of P is a lower bound on the cardinality of b. This together with rule 9 implies 
that a b-stable model of 17 satisfies C(t) if and only if t does not exceed the cardinality 
of b. 
By rules 3 and 9, we have C(0). Therefore, by rule 10, for any finite set of new 
constants b and for any b-stable model w of 17, w k F. That is, II entails F. However, F 
is not a logical consequence of lL7, because no c-stable model of 17 satisfies 3x( C (x) A 
-C(f(O,x)))* 
Now we pass to the proof of Theorem 7 for which we need the lemma below. This 
lemma is of interest in its own right, because an analogous result does not hold for open 
default theories, cf. [ 111. To state the lemma we need one more bit of notation. For a 
Herbrand b-interpretation w and a subset b’ of b we denote the restriction of w on Lb, 
by wl~~, That is, wIcC,, consists of all closed atoms of Lb’ which belong to w. 
Lemma 10. Let b be an infinite set of new constants, b’ be a countable subset of b, 
and let w be a b-stable model of 17. There exists a countable subset b” of b such that 
b’ 2 b”, w” = WI.+, is a b”-stable model of 17, and Litr. ( w”) = Litl: (w). 
Proof. For a literal L(xt , . . . ,x,) E Litl: whose free variables are among XI,. . .,x, 
we define a subset bt.0 of Termtb in the following manner. If w k L( xt , . . . , x,), then 
bL,o = 0. Otherwise, let tl, . . . , t, be any terms lo of Lb for which w k lL( tl, . . . , t,,). 
Then bL.0 consists of all elements of b which appear in tl , . . . , t,,. Let bo = b’ U 
U LELitc bL,o. Since b’ and Litr. are countable and each bL,o is finite, bo is countable. 
-. 
8 Actuall!r, the comparison with u is required only at the first step. On the subsequent s eps, the inequality 
trivially holds, because u is of the form f( ~1,142) and w is a new constant. 
‘The integer 0 is denoted by 0, and z + 1 is denoted by f( 0, z ). 
lo Say the first n-tuple in some fixed order. 
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Next we define a sequence bl, 62,. . . , bi, . . . of countable subsets of b by induction 
as follows. 
Assume that bi has been defined. Let wi = w[~~~ be the restriction of w on &,, and let 
A E Wi. Then there is an SLD-refutation PA of +- A from &$,. By the definition of fit, 
there is a finite subset nA of nb such that each rule in PA is of the form &, where 
7r E nA. We denote by bA,i the set of all elements of b which appear in the rules of nA 
and put &+I = bi U UA,zwlrbj bA,i. Since each of the bA,iS is finite and, by the induction 
hypothesis, bi is countable, bi+l is countable as well. 
Let b” = Us bi. Then b” is countable. We have to show that w” = w(~~,, = Ui”, wi is 
a b”-stable model of 17, i.e., w” = SUb” (w”). For the inclusion S,+J ( w”) C w” we shall 
prove first that U,$, C @,. Let r E 17”’ ,,,,, and let YB be a negative literal in the body of 
r. Since, by definition, fib” & Ub, it suffices to show that B $ w. Were B E w, since 
B is an atom of Lb,,, 
Now, I$: 
we would have B E w/~~,, = w”, in contradiction with r E @$. 
C l7$ implies i!f$ C fit, which in turn implies S,P (w”) & Snb (w) = w. 
Since S,P ( w”) is a Set of atoms of &, S&l (W”) c WI,&,, = W”. 
For the inclusion w” 5 S,,rr (w”) assume A E w”. Then for some i = 0, 1, . . ., A E wi. 
Let PA be the SLD-refutation of t A from fit and let 17~ C nb be the corresponding 
set of rules used in the definition of bA,i. That is, each rule in PA is of the form T+, 
where r E HA. Then, similarly to the proof of the inclusion n$, C @, in the previous 
paragraph, it follows from the definition of wi+l and w” that {& 1 n- E 17~) C i?$,. 
Therefore A E S,P (w”). 
It remains to show that LitL (w”) = Litr. (w) . The inclusion LitL (w) 2 LitL (w”) 
follows from [ 3, Exercise 1.3.5, p. 341. To prove the inclusion Litr.( w”) C Litr.( w), 
assume that L $ Litr.(w). Let tl,. . . , t, be the terms of TerrnL& for which w + 
lL(ll,..., t,,) used in the definition of bL,O. Then L( tl,. . . , tn> E LitLCb,,, which 
together with w” = WI,+, implies w” b lL( tl, . . . , tn). That is, L q?! LitL( w”). 0 
Proof of Theorem 7. We shall distinguish between the cases of finite and infinite b. 
Assume b is finite. Let E be a mapping from c onto b. (Such a mapping exists, because 
c is infinite.) We extend E to a mapping from TermLC onto TermEb by induction as 
follows. For an n-place function f of fZ and tl, . . . t, TermLc,, tl, . . . , t,,)) = 
f(E(tl)t... ,e(t,)).Letw’bedefinedbyw’={P(tl,...,t,) IP(e(tl),...,~(t,))~ 
w}. It immediately follows from the definition that w’ is a c-stable model of 17 such 
that Litr.(w) = Litr.(w’). 
If b is infinite, then the result follows from the lemma by renaming b” with c using 
any bijection between b” and c. •i 
6. Default theories and their extensions 
In this section we recall the definition of extensions for open default theories [ lo] 
needed for embeddings of logic programs into Reiter’s default logic [22]-one of the 
widely used nonmonotonic formalisms. 
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Default logic deals with rules of inference called defaults which are expressions of 
the form 
where 4x),/31(x),. . .,/h(x), m 2 0, and y(x) are formulas of first-order logic 
whose free variables are among x = x1, . . . , x,,. A default is closed if none of cy, pi,. . . , 
P m, and y contains a free variable. Otherwise it is open. Roughly speaking, the intuitive 
meaning of a default is as follows. For every n-tuple of objects t = tt , . . . , t,,, if a(t) 
is believed, and the pi( t)s are consistent with one’s beliefs, then one is permitted to 
deduce y(t) and add it to the “belief set”. 
A default theory is a pair (D, A), where D is a set of defaults and A is a set of 
first-order sentences (axioms). A default theory is closed, if all its defaults are closed. 
Otherwise it is open. 
Definition 11 (Reiter [22] ). Let (D, A) be a closed default theory. For any set of 
sentences S let r(D,A) (S) be the smallest deductively closed set of sentences B (beliefs) 
that contains A and satisfies the following condition. 
IfawED,a.EB,and+3t ,..., l&,$!S,thenyEB. 
A set o?sentences E is an extension for (D, A) if r(D,A) (E) = E, i.e., if E is a fixed 
point of the operator T(D,A). 
Next we give an equivalent semantical definition of extensions for closed default 
theories. 
Definition 12 (Guerreiro and Casanova [ 91) . Let (D, A) be a closed default theory. 
For any class of Herbrand interpretations W let X(D,A) ( W) be the largest class V of 
Herbrand models of A that satisfies the following condition. 
If~~,D,aEThc(V),andlPl,...,~P,~Thr(W),thenyETh~(V). 
It is known from [9] that the definition of extensions as the theories of the fixed 
points of the operator 2 is equivalent to original Reiter’s definition (Definition 11). 
That is, a set of sentences E is an extension for a closed default theory (D, A) if and 
only if E = Thr. ( W) for some fixed point W of Z(D,A). 
Now, following [ 141 and [lo], we define extensions for open default theories. We 
start with the intuition lying behind our definition. 
There ,are two types of objects in the domain of a default theory. One type consists of 
thefied built in objects which are closed terms of C (Term&) and must be present in 
any Herbrand interpretation, and the other type consist of implicitly defined unknown ob- 
jects which may vary from one Herbrand interpretation to other, e.g., objects introduced 
by existentially quantified formulas. These objects generate other unknown objects by 
means of the functions of .C. Thus, it seems natural to assume that the theory domain is 
a Herbrand universe of the original language augmented with a set of new (unknown) 
objects, cf. [ 16, Chapter 1, Section 31. 
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The following definition of extensions for open default theories is a relativization 
of Definition 12 to Herbrand b-interpretations with an infinite set of new constants b. 
The reason for passing to a semantical definition is that, in general, it is impossible to 
describe a Herbrand universe by means of a proof theory. The only exception is the case 
when the theory domain is provably finite, see [ 111. 
Definition 13 (Kaminski [lo] ). Let b be an infinite set of new constants and let 
(D, A) be a default theory. For any set of Herbrand b-interpretations W let AFo Aj ( W) 
be the largest set V of Herbrand b-models of A that satisfies the following condition. 
For any a(x :M 1 x ,..., M 11, x ( ) Y(X) E D and any tuple t of elements of Term6 if a(t) E 
Tht,(V) and +1(t),..., +&,(t) q! Thaw, then y(t) E Z&(V). Note that a(t), 
+I (t), . . ., sdt), and y(t) are sentences of Lb. 
A set of sentences E is called a b-extension for (D, A) if E = Thr. ( W) for some 
fixed point W of AFo Aj. It is known from [ 10, Theorem 421 that for closed default 
theories Definition 13 ‘is equivalent to the original Reiter’s definition (Definition 11). 
7. Embedding logic programs into default logic 
There is a tight relationship between the original Gelfond-Lifschitz stable model 
semantics for logic programs and extensions for closed default theories, see [ 171. In 
this section we first show that there is a similar relationship between the extended 
stable model semantics for logic programs based on an infinite set of new constants 
and extensions for open default theories. Then we present two new embeddings of logic 
programs into default logic which emphasize the negation-as-failure nature of the stable 
model semantics. 
With a rule rr of the form A +- BI, . . . , Bk, lBk+l,. . . , -B”,, where BI,. . . , B, are 
atoms, we associate the default 
denoted T(T), and for a program n we define the set of defaults r(n) by r(n) = 
{r(r) )7&l. l l 
Theorem 14. An atom A is a logical consequence of a program I7 under the stable 
model semantics if and only if A belongs to all extensions for (T( IT), 0). 
Theorem 14 is a straightforward corollary to Theorem 15. 
Theorem 15. Let b be an injinite set of new constants. If w is a b-stable model of 
a program IT, then {ZJ 1 u k nk} is a jixed point of AtT(nj,lj. Conversely, each jixed 
point of $,(,),B) is of the form {v 1 u b fit}, where w is a b-stable model of 17. 
‘I The “closed” version of the translation 7 appeared for the first time in [ 171 and in [2]. 
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Proof. For a set of Herbrand b-interpretations W we denote by min W the Herbrand 
b-interpretation fiUEw u. We contend that $‘r(,),e) ( W) = {U 1 u + I?‘,$,,}. Indeed, for 
a tuple t of elements of TermLc, and a predicate P, P(t) $8 ThL, ( W) if and only if 
P(t) $! min W. Thus, for a default 
A;, Bi(X> : M-k+l(X),.. .,M+z(x) 
A(x) 
, 
E ,...,&(t) imply A(t) if 
only each fiknw. That W) is 
b-models which 
Now, part follows from above fact that 
model have 1 u k = w. 
Conversely, by W = {u 1 u b &$,,w}, 
noEW that snb( w) denotes the least Herbrand 
b-model of fl:.) Thus, min W is a b-stable model of ZI, which completes the proof. 0 
Now, with a rule r of the form A t- B1, . . . , Bk, -d?k+l, . . . , YB,,,, where BI, . . . , B, 
are atoms, we associate the default 
:ikh&+,,...,ki-d$,, 
r\f=, Bi > A ’ 
denoted O(V), and for a program L7 we define the set of defaults O(n) by O(n) = 
{O(r) )%-En. I2 
Theorem1 16. Let b be an infinite set of new constants. If w is a b-stable model of 
a progra,m I7, then {v 1 v k nt} is a $xed point of A~,(,j,tij. Conversely, each $.xed 
point of ~$s(nj,flj is of the form {v 1 u b &‘i}, where w is a b-stable model of 17. 
The proof of Theorem 16 is similar to that of Theorem 15 and will be omitted. The 
following corollary to Theorem 16 is similar to Theorem 14. 
Corollary 17. An atom A is a logical consequence of a program II under the stable 
model semantics if and only if A belongs to all extensions of (0 (II), 8). 
Note that the stable model semantics also allows to obtain negative conclusions (rep- 
resented by negative literals), whereas Theorem 15 (embedding r) and the corollary 
to Theorem 16 (embedding 6’) are restricted to atoms (positive literals) only. Be- 
low, sim&rly to [8, Proposition 21, we modify the embeddings r and 8 so that the 
negative conclusions are preserved as well. The modification is based on the closed 
world assumption [21] whose default counterpart is as follows. Let Pr_c denote the set 
l* The “claNsed” version of the translation 0 appeared for the first time in [ 171 and, to some extent, in [ 51. 
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-P(x) > PEIfc ’ 
denoted OVA. 
With a rule r of the form A t L1, . . . , L,, we associate the default 
#:I Li 1 
A ’ 
denoted r’(r), and for a program I7 we define the set of defaults r’(n) by r’(n) = 
{r’(‘rr) )&7. 
Theorem 18. Let b be an infinite set of new constants. If w is a b-stable model of a 
program II, then {w} is a fixed point of A~T,~n~UmA,~~. Conversely, each fixed point of 
A&(t7)UcW4,L3) is of the form {w}, where w is a b-stable model of II. 
The proof of Theorem 18 is similar to that of Theorem 15, but is based on the 
observation that A~T,~,~,o~ (W) = {S,p (min W)}. We leave details to the reader. 
Corollary 19. A literal L is a logical consequence of a program 17 under the stable 
model semantics tf and only if L belongs to all extensions of (r’( L7) U CWA, 8). 
Finally, with a rule rr of the form A c B,, . . . , Bk, lBk+l,. . . , lBm, where Bl,. . . , 
B, are atoms, we associate the default 
denoted e’(r), and for a program L’ we define the set of defaults 13’( Z7) by t?( 17) = 
V(n) )7&r. 
Theorem 20. Let b be an infinite set of new constants. If w is a b-stable model of a 
program L7, then {w} is a fixed point of A~s,~n~ucwA,ca~. Conversely, each fixed point 
of A&(t7)“CWA,@) is of the form {w}, where w is a b-stable model of IT. 
Again, the proof will be omitted. 
Corollary 21. A literal L is a logical consequence of a program 17 under the stable 
model semantics if and only if L belongs to all extensions of (9’( Ii’), 0). 
Note that Corollaries 19 and 21 are much stronger than [8, Proposition 21 that 
presumes both the stable model uniqueness and the domain closure assumption. Also, 
in contrast to Theorem 14 and Corollary 17 which deal with atoms only, Corollaries 19 
and 21 allow to reason about liter&. 
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Remark 22. Apart from “cutting” exactly stable models of a logic program 17 from 
fixed points of flfT,,, IJ and d:,(,) @), the embeddings T’ and 0’, by minimizing the 
extensions of the predicates of L, iidicate a relationship between logic programs and 
circumscription, cf. [ 10, Section lo]. 
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